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Multiple Realizability, Identity Theory, and the Gradual Reorganization Principle


Abstract: In the literature on multiple realizability and the identity theory, cases of neural plasticity have enjoyed a very limited role.  The present paper attempts to remedy this small influence by arguing that clinical and experimental evidence of quite extensive neural reorganization offers compelling support for the claim that psychological kinds are multiply realized in neurological kinds, thus undermining the identity theory.  In particular, cases are presented where subjects with no measurable psychological deficits also have vast, though gradually received, neurological damage.  Common objections and concerns are also discussed and rejected.

1. Introduction
	A famous objection to the identity theory comes from the multiple realizability of psychological kinds.  Putnam (1967) and Fodor (1974) raise the possibility that the same psychological kinds are realized in different neurological kinds (or, even more broadly, in different physical kinds).  Since the identity theory maintains that a given psychological kind is identical with some neurological kind, the truth of multiple realizability would show that the identity theory is false.  Putnam’s basic idea behind the early appeals to multiple realizability was the unlikelihood that certain psychological states which, say, humans plausibly share with other animals (pain being Putnam’s pet example) are realized in the same neurological states.  Block and Fodor (1972), on the other hand, is notable for extending multiple realizability to the realm of the individual by invoking neural plasticity.  Instead of relying on the implausibility of psychologically continuous, though taxonomically distinct, creatures sharing the same neurological kinds, Block and Fodor were the first to point out that a single individual could manage to enjoy states of the same psychological kind while realizing that kind in distinct types of neurological states.  In particular, they point out that insult to the left hemisphere (the hemisphere in which linguistic functions are carried out in most human subjects) often results in the right hemisphere taking over control with no speech-related deficits.  
	Block and Fodor, however, do not expand on their treatment of the neural plasticity much beyond pointing in the direction just indicated.  In fact, in all of the writings on multiple realizability since Block and Fodor little has been done to extend its discussion.  Two notable exceptions are Shapiro (2004) and Polger (2009), in which the goal was merely to offer a defense of identity theory from attacks grounded in neural plasticity, not to look for evidence of multiple realizability in the neuroscientific literature.  The purpose of the present paper is to build on Block’s and Fodor’s original idea and pursue the hope that cases of plasticity do offer evidence for multiple realizability.  To sum up the main contention: there are examples described in neuroscientific work that demonstrate that individual creatures can be psychologically identical with their future selves, though distinct neurological kinds maintain that psychological identity.  This shows that the relevant kinds do not form the one-to-one correspondence required by the identity theory.
	It is worth warning the reader from the outset, however, that only the empirical case for multiple realizability will be discussed.  There are ways of defending the identity theory which can sidestep much of the attack made below against the view below.  A priori arguments for the identity theory, like Kim’s causal exclusion worries (see his 1992 and 2005), will not be affected by the line taken.  For simplicity’s sake, this paper sets aside a priori approaches and says nothing more about them.  Instead, the goal is to reinforce the empirical case of multiple realizability, particularly against writers who acknowledge the conceptual possibility of multiple realizability, but who also think there is no empirical evidence to support the view (especially Shapiro 2000).  

2. The GRP, Serial Lesion Effect, and Multiple Realizability

	In order to bolster the empirical case, I want to invoke an effect which I will boringly call the Gradual Reorganization Principle (hereafter GRP), which states that the brain will reorganize neurological processes in response to degenerations of all kinds, thus saving psychological capacities, assuming sufficient time is allowed for the brain to adapt.  As the brain damage slowly takes away neural functioning, the brain will recruit other regions, sometimes remote and sometimes near, to perform the processing required to maintain the psychological capacity.  The length of time required by the brain to redistribute the processing adequately is difficult to determine, but there is a clear difference in functional restoration between abrupt brain damage (e.g., from strokes) and gradual brain damage (e.g, from slow-growing tumors), where the former kind usually results in marked psychological deficits and the former in little or no measurable deficits.  This principle is relevant to multiple realizability because neurological cases which can be described by it provide evidence of the same psychological abilities instantiated in a variety of neurological substrates.  
	But rather than speaking generally about the GRP, it would be more helpful to look at a specific example of the principle: the so-called serial lesion effect.  Researchers have known about the serial lesion effect, conducting numerous experiments in order to pin down the particulars, since at least the 1930s (see Kennard 1938 or Kleitman and Camille 1932) and the 1940s (see Ades and Raab 1946, and Kennard 1942).  In fact, Finger et al (1973) report it was known that resection of neural tissue in stages, compared with resection of the same tissue in one surgical sitting, is correlated with lower mortality rates from as far back as the middle of the nineteenth century.  Fluorens (1824) was able to keep decorticated pigeons alive for much longer periods of time when the tissue removal was done in small amounts rather than immediately.  Surprisingly, however, this effect has not made it into the philosophy of mind literature, though it offers excellent grounds for doubting the identity theory.  The basic concept is easy to understand.  To phrase it informally, the idea is that removing neural tissue in a serial manner, bit by bit rather than instantaneously, usually allows for a substantial degree of functional recovery—just as the GRP predicts.  In other words, if one compares two brain damaged individuals, both of whom have lost the same amount of tissue in the same locations, the individual whose damage was received in a piecemeal fashion, rather than being immediate and all at once, will enjoy a much greater degree of psychological recovery than his all at once companion.  Many times the patients with seriatim damage still do have noticeable, though usually slight, deficits in comparison with non-damaged controls.  But in many other cases—the really interesting ones from the point of view of multiple realizability—serial patients have no measurable psychological deficits at all, compared with neurological normals or whomever else.  These later cases, where brain damage is paired with no functional anomalies, provide just the sort of evidence an advocate of multiple realizability would be looking for.  Here are the same psychological abilities linked with fundamentally different neurological structures.  Remarkably, where certain neurological kinds were previously critical for instantiating psychological kinds, after serial lesions to the previously important tissue, the psychological kinds are relocated to different tissue, hence to different neurological kinds.  

2.1 A Case Study of the Serial Lesion Effect

	 An illustrative study of this effect is Patrissi and Stein (1975).  In this experiment, the researchers had forty-six albino rats placed into five surgical treatment groups.  One of the groups underwent bilateral removal of the frontal cortex, removing both hemispheres of the frontal lobe in one surgery.  Three groups received only unilateral resections of the frontal lobe in two separate surgeries, one hemisphere being removed during the first surgery and the other removed in the second.  In these groups, the one half was removed followed by the other half either 10 days later, 20 days later, or 30 days later.  The final group served as the control group, undergoing only sham surgery.  From there the different groups were tested in a T-maze on a spatial alternation task, where, after the rats are rewarded for choosing one of the goal arms, the reward was switched to the other arm on the next run.  The goal was to ‘reach criterion’, which meant correctly choosing the reward arm as it alternated for two straight days (at 16 trials a day).
	The results were measured in how many days it took each group to reach criterion on average.  In terms of raw data, the sham surgery rats took 124.8 ± 35.22 days; the two-stage, 30-day interoperative interval rats took 140.8 ± 32.7 days; the two-stage, 20-day interoperative interval rats took 156.4 ± 48.58 days; the two-stage, 10-day interoperative interval rats, however, took 270.4 ± 56.17 days; finally, the one-stage rats took a whopping 427.4 ± 67.7 days to reach criterion.  In terms of analysis, the shams, the two-stage, 30-day interval rats, and the two-stage, 20-day interval rats did not differ significantly from each other.  In other words, the differences between the sham rats and the one-stage lesion rats were—unsurprisingly—significant, the latter group taking over three times as many days to reach criterion as the former group.  The same results were obtained comparing the sham group to the two-stage rats which were only allowed a 10-day interval between surgeries.  The difference there was only about 130 days more for the seriatim group, but it was enough to reach significance.  In fact, these two groups (one-stage and two-stage, 10-day interval) were significantly different from the other three groups.  Now, Patrissi and Stein do not provide the exact p-values for each of these comparisons, but it is worth noting that the comparison between the shams and 10-day interval rats must have been closer to insignificance than the sham/one-stage comparison, suggesting that even the two-stage, 10-day interval seriatim rats were much more psychological similar to the sham rats than were the one-stage rats.  Indeed, Patrissi and Stein report that the one-stage rats did perform significantly worse than the two-stage, 10-day interval rats.  This fact further underscores the importance of the GRP: the brain will recover from lesions if the damage is gradual, even in cases such as these where the interoperative interval is relatively small.
	Most importantly, however, the sham group did not differ significantly from either the 20-day or 30-day two-stage lesion rats.  Patrissi and Stein did not offer any exact p-values for comparisons of these three insignificantly different groups, claiming only that the mark required for significance was set at the customary 0.05 level.  This indicates that the differences in the mean number of days to reach criterion for these three groups were likely to be statistical anomalies and not supportive of any serious psychological difference.  Consequently, there are no measurable psychological differences between the two seriatim groups with extensive neurological damage and the sham group with no neurological damage at all.
	In addition, once the previous testing was completed, the authors decided to add additional experimental animals to control for the possibility that the surgical trauma might have accounted for much of the delays in reaching criterion.  So one group of seven rats received a two-stage sham operation with a 10-day interoperative interval, and a second group of five rats simply received two separate injections of saline 10 days apart to control for the injections involved in all the other operations and for trauma simply during handling.  The results for these rats were 217 ± 88.5 for the two-stage sham operated rats and 208 ± 19.6 for the saline injected rats​[1]​.  The differences were not significant from each other.  Hence the behavior of these further control rats shows that the trauma from surgery (for all of the groups of rats) “had little, if any, bearing on subsequent learning”. (Patrissi and Stein 1975, pg. 477)
	Thus the basic idea is that the brain can recover from fairly significant lesions to recover to a normal level of performance, assuming that the damage occurs over a suitable period of time.  If the damage afflicting a particular area is sudden and occurs in a one-time fashion, the deficits are significantly worse than if the damage to the same area is gradual.  More particularly, if the damage occurs gradually, the brain can find ways to implement the same psychological functions using whatever is left.  

2.2 Evaluating the Case Study’s Evidence for Multiple Realizability

	For the present purposes, this experiment is interesting because it shows that the same psychological ability can be multiply realized in different neurological kinds.  In order to see this, it is best to start by analyzing the psychological ability.  The authors never make it clear what spatial alternation tasks are used to measure, but generally these tasks show the extent to which a subject is capable of suppressing previously correct responses.  The alternation of the reward forces the organism to suppress the information it has of its former location.  The selection of the frontal cortex for resection makes sense, too, in the context of this task.  This area in the rat (or at least sub-areas of it), much like the human frontal cortex, is involved (among other things) in planning actions for the future.  Part of the process of planning for the future involves forming representations of different courses of actions, calculating their consequences, comparing those consequences to the goals and preferences of the organism, and selecting one option while also suppressing the other alternatives.  The neural implementation of these abilities is, roughly speaking, the frontal lobe.  Thus in the same way that ventral frontal patients in humans show dysfunctions in decision-making (Bechara et al 2000), so too the one-stage rats are very impaired in their ability to make decisions that will lead them to obtaining the rewards and reaching criterion.  The psychological ability in question is something like the ability to suppress particular choices when making decisions—viz., in this case, to inhibit previously correct responses (from biasing the behavior of the rat to choose the wrong arm).  The lack of a significant difference in the controls, the two-stage, 30-day interval rats, and the two-stage, 20-day interval rats suggests that these animals are psychologically homogeneous in at least this respect.  
	What about the neurological kinds?  Here the answers are less clear, but enough to establish the multiple realizability of the ability to inhibit behavioral responses.  What is known for sure and worth mentioning is that the authors took great care to ensure that the rats in all of the lesioned groups received as similar damage as possible.  They performed a one-way analysis of variance to determine whether the different groups had sustained significantly different damage.  The outcome of the analysis was that the “resultant F value was not significant . . . indicating that the amount of frontal tissue removed was approximately the same across the groups with different interoperative intervals”. (Patrissi and Stein 1975, pg. 476)  So there is no worry about differences in the extent of the resections explaining why some rats suffered from greater deficits than others.    
	But the key question obviously is: in which new, distinct cortical areas are the relevant psychological functions realized?  Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell.  The types of functional brain scans available since the early 90s—so popular for localizing psychological functions—were unavailable during these experiments.  The researchers could have used something like single-cell recordings to locate the areas in all of the groups which responded differentially according to the task, but the point of their research was not to locate the neurological substrates of response inhibition (or anything else), so it is impossible to tell exactly where the psychological functions have migrated in the lesioned rats.  In neurologically normal rats, the prelimbic cortex (see Delatour and Gisquet-Verrier, 1996; Jonkman et al, 2009) and the infralimbic cortex (see Chudasama and Robbins, 2003) of the frontal cortex have been implicated in the inhibition of Pavlovian and instrumental responses.  These areas do not participate in the learning of the associations, but simply aid in the suppression of responses that are inappropriate for the situation.  The researchers removed these areas in the lesioned rats, so they obviously cannot be instantiating the psychological abilities being tested.  But it is unfortunately anyone’s guess which neural regions are performing these executive tasks in the experimental rats.  
	What is clear, keeping in mind that the damage was fairly constant, is that there is little psychological difference in the first three groups, though an entire lobe is missing in the seriatim lesion rats.  As the one-stage lesion rats show, the frontal cortex is important for reaching criterion.  If suppressing previously correct responses were mediated by, say, the temporal lobe, then all of the rats would have performed the same. The obvious explanation is that the two-stage lesion rats must have been using some entirely different lobe, thus some entirely different neurological kind, to reach criterion.  I obviously do not know which areas those are; the authors include no information about what areas are now processing the relevant information.  But it also seems unnecessary to know.  The prelimbic and infralimbic cortices are part of the frontal cortex of the rat, leaving little doubt about their complete destruction since the researchers removed the entire frontal lobe in the experimentals.  Setting aside dualism, some other genuinely distinct neural area(s) must be carrying out the inhibitory processing.  The rats thus provide rather stark evidence in favor of multiple realizability.  Here, within an individual, there is significant psychological similarity realized in different neural structures.  
	A common rejoinder in the literature at this point is to be critical of the grain size used to identify the neurological and psychological kinds.  But notice there are no such worries in the foregoing case.  Bechtel and Mundale (1999) were the first to point out that many putative examples of multiple realization involve a very loose classification of psychological kinds matched with a very strict classification of neurological kinds, making it very easy to provide spurious evidence against the identity theory.  If psychological kinds are typed in a coarse manner while neurological kinds are typed very finely, then almost every psychological sameness will be realized in a neurological difference.  For instance, Putnam’s famous example about octopi in pain arguably relies on such a mismatch of grain.  Probably octopi and humans do not share the same kinds of pains unless one adopts a very coarse notion of what counts as the same pain.  Meanwhile, the classificatory grain used to mark the differences between octopi and human brains is typically much more demanding.  Were the grain sizes kept similar, either there would not be enough similarity between the human and octopi psychological kinds or there would not be enough difference between the relevant octopi and human neurological kinds to support the one being multiply realized in the other.  
Patrissi’s and Stein’s rats do not provide that kind of trivial evidence, however.  When the grain sizes for both the psychological and neurological sides are held equal, excepting perhaps the most implausibly coarse grain, the results still show that the psychological kinds are multiply realized in the neurological ones.  To explain, remember that there are only four lobes in the rat brain.  In the present case, the psychological grain is somewhat fine.  Of all the executive tasks to take into consideration (integrating incoming sensory information, exploitation of top-down connections (to modulate attention), evaluation of the importance of stimuli and behavioral responses, etc.), the suppression of inappropriate responses is the only psychological function the experimenters are directly testing.  On the other hand, the classificatory grain for the neurological kinds is about as coarse as possible.  The authors did not simply remove the medial wall of the prefrontal cortex (the location of the infralimbic and prelimbic cortices), but the entire frontal cortex.  There is an obvious mismatch of the grain sizes, but it is not one that runs afoul of the spirit of Bechtel’s and Mundale’s principle.  Their suggestion is that matching a coarse-grained psychological kind with a fine-grained set of neurological kinds provides illusory evidence for multiple realizability, not a matching of fine-grained psychological kinds with coarse-grained neurological kinds.  If anything, the latter kind of mismatch provides better evidence for multiple realizability than contexts where the grain size is matched.  If some rather fine-grained psychological kind (e.g., inhibition of behavioral responses) can be shown to be multiply realized even in very coarse-grained neurological kinds (e.g., those typed by reference to entire lobes), then a fortiori that psychological kind must be multiply realized in neurological kinds typed at all other finer levels, too.  
	So even if one implausibly says the entire frontal lobe is necessary for reaching criterion (adopting a coarse-grained view of neurological kinds), its entire removal in the lesioned subjects still shows that some other (area of another) lobe is carrying out the processing, providing evidence that some distinct neurological kinds are processing the same information the frontal lobe formerly was.  If it is necessary to match that coarse level of grain on the psychological side, the case is a cinch.  At that level, it is arguably the case that all of the rats are the same (and not just the sham, 30-day, and 20 day interval experimentals).  After all, even the one-stage lesion rats reached criterion.  The increased number of days it took that group (relative to the others) could be overlooked if what constitutes psychological similarity is as loosely construed as the neurological case (assuming our ignorance of the specifics forces us to retreat to that very coarse-grained perspective).  

3. The GRP More Generally

	These serial lesion cases are specific instances of the more general GRP, which holds, to repeat, that the brain will reorganize neurological processes in response to brain damage of all kinds if it is allowed enough time to adapt.  This is indicated by the Patrissi and Stein study where it they demonstrate that a small interoperative interval did not result in as much functional sparing as with the patients with longer intervals between the lesions.  But this effect is hardly peculiar to the surgeon’s scalpel.  For instance, it is well known that damage to the pars compacta of the substantia nigra results in movement disorders like Parkinson’s.  The pars compacta is an important area for the production of the neurotransmitter dopamine.  One of its most important projection zones is the striatum, which is critical for producing movements.  Once this area of the substantia nigra begins to deteriorate, dopamine transmission in the striatum lowers and Parkinson’s is the result.  It is also well known that the substantia nigra as a whole deteriorates in all humans, much the same as humans naturally lose brain tissue of all kinds over the course of their lives.  What is remarkable about the loss of the pars compacta, however, is that humans are able to overcome around 80% of its deterioration without any deficits (see Kass et al 2008 and Bernheimer et al 1973).  Most people typically have enough of this area to last a lifetime (even through its natural deterioration), but through other genetic factors (or through an amphetamine addiction) the rate of its deterioration can be accelerated to the point that the 80% threshold is broken.  From the perspective of multiple realizability, the interesting fact about the substantia nigra is that it shows again the ability of the brain to survive functionally while its tissue is damaged—provided that the damage occurs slowly enough to allow all of the necessary rewiring.
	Another example of the GRP is the difference between slow-growing tumors (e.g., low grade gliomas) and acute strokes.  In the same way that serial lesions typically offer much better chances of functional recovery, so too slow-growing tumors are usually accompanied by little or no deficits—in stark contrast with the comparatively debilitating results of strokes.  In fact, in about 80% of patients, the functional recovery is so substantial that the presence of low grade gliomas is not revealed by deficits in behavior but usually by the sudden occurrence of seizures (DeAngelis 2001).  One study (Duffau et al 2003) accumulated data over 5 years on 103 subjects with cortical or subcortical low grade gliomas who suffered from only mild deficits or no deficits at all.  After the tumors were taken out, 94% of the patients recovered to preoperative psychological levels within 3 months.  Thus, the same general kind of principle in the serial lesion cases holds true in the literature on tumors and strokes: as long as the brain has time to rewire and find other ways to carry out the same processes, it can usually overcome damage.  As neurosurgery has improved, it has become possible to remove low-grade gliomas before they become so large as to affect behavioral performance.  As a result, it has been found that fairly major regions of the brain can be removed without creating measurable behavioral problems, including Broca’s area, the left and right insula, the sensorimotor cortex, the supplementary motor area, the left posterior parietal cortex and even the temporal lobes (see Desmurget et al 2007, pg. 899, for citations of these examples).  Hence the GRP one finds at work in the literature on serial lesions is mirrored by findings in neurooncology.  Individuals who are psychologically the same can nevertheless suffer from profound destruction of the brain, indicating that the same psychological kinds can be instantiated in many different neurological kinds.

4. Objections to the GRP as Evidence for Multiple Realizability
4.1 Small Plastic Effects and Neurological Taxonomies

One obvious objection to the case I have been building is that bare differences in the location of the neural processing are not enough to show that truly distinct neurological kinds are involved (see especially Polger 2009 for more of this line).  For all anyone knows it is possible that the relocation of the processing still makes no important neurological difference.  A common response to cases of plasticity is to complain that the new regions instantiating the same psychological kind, since these regions are typically adjacent to the damaged tissue, are not genuinely distinct.  That is, since the examples of plasticity usually cited in philosophy involve recruitment of adjacent tissue to restore psychological processes, an identity theorist can protest that the differences in the neurological states which are processing the psychological processes pre- and post-lesion (at the finest levels of grain there must be some) are arguably not enough to count as genuine differences in neurological kinds.  
	But notice that in the serial lesion study discussed above, this strategy is not going to be an option.  In the Patrissi and Stein case the damage is almost laughably coarse (when compared with the hyper-specific genetics-based lesions created in today’s laboratories).  When trying to undercut the rats’ ability to inhibit previously correct responses, it was not necessary to remove the entire frontal lobe.  Ablation of the more medial and anterior portions of the frontal cortex would have been sufficient to bring about the psychological deficits found in the one-stage rats. Removal of the entire lobe, whether Patrissi and Stein knew it or not, was definitely overkill.  In particular, the infralimbic and prelimbic cortices are located in a much more anterior portion of the frontal lobe.  To remove the frontal cortex, it would be necessary to take out at least the cingulate areas, some secondary motor areas, and possibly even some of retrosplenial cortex, making it likely that the new areas instantiating the spared psychological kinds are quite distant from the previous, damaged areas.  Hence that overkill also likely implies that some other remote area of the brain, in a nonadjacent region, is responsible for the psychological similarity of the experimental animals with the controls.  This case of plasticity does not involve a simple recruitment of adjacent neural tissue—undercutting altogether the identity theorist’s defense rehearsed above.  
	The identity theorist has further options in this vein, but they are also not plausible.  In response to cases like these of remote reorganization, it is always possible to make the neurological grain more coarse and try to argue that even rather (spatially) different reorganizations still do not suffice to mark differences in types of neurological states.  The problem with this move is that neurological taxonomy is subject to theorizing in the neurosciences.  The types of neurological states one finds there, however, are never so coarse as to accommodate this second strategy of the identity theorist.  One finds references to kinds like the anterior cingulate cortex, the orbitofrontal cortex, the subgenual cingulate cortex, or even to Brodmann areas like 43 and 44, each of which is very much contained to a specific location within a single (here, frontal) lobe.  Of course this grain of classifying is probably too coarse for neuroscience’s purposes, too.  Within the orbitofrontal cortex, for instance, there are subareas devoted to processing very specific information.   The lateral orbitofrontal cortex, for instance, is known to be the exclusive processor of information related to punishing stimuli.  Since the identity theory and multiple realizability are both empirical theses, one must pay attention to the neurosciences and the kinds employed in that field.  These kinds appear fine-grained enough, though, to allow cases of the serial lesion effect to involve differences in neurological kinds, particularly when those serial lesions result in the destruction of an entire lobe full of such neurological kinds.​[2]​  

4.2 But Do Neural Regions and Locations Even Matter At All?

	Another objection, a sort of extension of the complaint mentioned above, is that I have focused too much on the location of the processing, rather than on identifying neurological kinds.  In order to explain this criticism, it might be best to digress for a moment and press an argument which appears compelling, but which a hypothetical opponent would probably find objectionable in just the manner under consideration.  In this way, two birds can be killed with one stone: the general implications of the GRP are developed while a common objection is also dismissed.
	The conclusion to this apparently compelling argument is that cases of the GRP show the best empirical grounds for believing the identity theory are no good.  The only serious empirical argument for the identity theory is that psychological processes and kinds are correlated with distinct brain regions.  The very existence of fMRI and PET scans is a testament to the force of this argument, for example.  Many studies using these imaging techniques demonstrate tight neurological correlations with particular psychological capabilities.  Broca’s area was the first major breakthrough in the mid-19th century for the hypothesis that particular neural regions are responsible for carrying out psychological processes.  There are countless more examples to throw on the pile, however: the primary visual cortex, the primary auditory cortex, the primary motor cortex, the fusiform face area (an area which responds preferentially to faces and pictures of faces), the parahippocampal place area (an area that responds preferentially to pictures of scenes rather than faces), or the extrastriate body area (an area that responds preferentially to pictures of human bodies or body parts), just to name a few.  Each provides evidence for the idea that certain psychological kinds are identical to activations of certain neurological areas.  
	Of course, imaging studies only provide correlative data and not identities.  The correlations confirmed by imaging studies notoriously do not demonstrate that causal connections exist between psychological functions and the neural areas.  It is always possible that the neural tissue picked out by the images is actually a downstream consequence of the area which is causally responsible for the psychological process.  But there is no shortage of lesion studies which support image-based correlations of neural regions and psychological kinds.  An autopsy of Broca’s famous patient who could only say ‘tan’ demonstrated that his brain had suffered extensive damage to the posterior inferior frontal gyrus, suggesting strongly that this area of the frontal cortex is causally responsible for speech production (and not merely a correlate of that ability).  Given the compatibility of image-based correlations and lesion-based causal inferences, it is natural to suppose that these studies provide evidence for genuine psychoneural identities.  
	But that is the rub with the GRP and serial lesions cases like the one discussed above: they directly undermine the usual empirical arguments for the identity theory.  Image and lesion studies come near to providing clinching evidence for the relevant identities, but they fall short.  The following conditional is clear: if a given neurological region were really identical to some psychological kind, then the destruction of the former would mean the destruction of the latter.  That is, when a subject suffers from a complete destruction of Broca’s area, he or she, while still comprehending language, will simply be unable to produce it (assuming the relevant identity).  But that is empirically just not true.  To put things more accurately: if a patient loses the neural region quickly, then the psychological ability is also irrevocably lost.  Instances of the GRP show that if one ablates a critical neurological area slowly enough, the brain is capable of redistributing the processing that realizes the psychological ability.  In normal human subjects, Broca’s area, say, is the locus of language production.  But the brain’s plasticity does make it possible to overcome resection of Broca’s area without having any of the associated deficits (for an example, see Duffau et al 2002).  Since destroying a given neurological region need not imply the destruction of the related psychological kind, it must be false that the region is identical with the kind.  The GRP thus shows that the standard empirical evidence for the identity theory is illusory.
	But in formulating this line of reasoning against the identity theorist, the identities have been construed as between psychological kinds and distinct brain regions, noting that fMRI studies, lesion studies, and the like have been useful for picking out neural areas that correlate with or are causally responsible for psychological tasks of all types.  A defender of the identity theory could renew the criticism mentioned above (in 4.1), though taking it in a different direction than Polger’s concerns about adjacency.  In particular, the identity theorist could complain that her identities have nothing necessarily to do with brain regions or precise areas of neural tissue, but rather just involve an identity between psychological and neurological kinds.  The location (brain region) of the neural activation, according to this move, might have no essential connection to the real taxonomy of neurological state types.  The identity theorist might therefore conclude that the GRP and serial lesion effect only undermine a conclusion she never held in the first place.  Cases of the GRP only show that destruction of some neural area previously correlated with a psychological kind is consistent with the preservation of that psychological kind, not that the destruction of the some neurological kind thought to be identical with a psychological kind is consistent with the preservation of that psychological kind.  And it is the last kind of consistency which is what GRP studies would have to demonstrate in order to undermine genuine psychoneural identities.  
	To get down to business finally, this response will also not work.  The identity theory is, to repeat, an empirical thesis at the mercy of empirical research.  The point of mentioning fMRI studies and correlations between psychological kinds and brain regions is to describe the only empirical evidence an identity theorist can offer for the view.  The taxonomies that working neuroscientists develop revolve around specifying neural regions.  The very names of some of the kinds enumerated by neuroscientists bear witness to the importance of brain areas: the insula (island), the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the precentral gyrus, etc.  If there is a plausible identity of a psychological function like ‘suppression of a behavioral option’ with a type of neurological state, then that type of state will have to be something like ‘such-and-such activation in the infralimbic cortex’.  The ‘such-and-such activation in such-and-such a place’ leaves an obvious promissory note, but not one to raise any important hackles.  As the neurosciences progress it will become possible to state the identity theorist’s thesis more accurately.  At any rate, it is clear that if ‘suppression of a behavioral option’ is identical with ‘such-and-such activation of the infralimbic cortex’, then there can be no behavioral suppression without an infralimbic cortex.  
	It is of course always open for the identity theorist to deny that the relevant identities look like this—that the neurological (or psychological) kinds are to be interpreted this way—but of course the identity theorist is now on the hook for some positive construal of the view.  If the psychological kinds are not identified with the activation of some neural region, then with what exactly are they identified?  One could reply that psychological kinds are identical with we-know-not-(yet)-what, but, if such a move actually tenders a genuine theory at all, it only makes the identity theory mysterious and impossible to evaluate.  Without having any hypothesis about what the relevant identities are, the identity theorist clearly can have no reason to think the view is true.  It would be impossible to attack on grounds of the GRP, of course, but that is no problem because there can also be no argument for a claim as indefinite as ‘psychological kinds are identical with we-know-not-(yet)-what’.




	It is surprising that the philosophical work on multiple realizability has never contained a discussion of anything like the GRP or, more specifically, the serial lesion effect.  The literature on the effect is quite old, too, with the Patrissi and Stein paper cited here coming comparatively quite late in the game.  Perhaps this owes to the fact that information in the neurosciences can be obsolete within months (much less decades) and it is usually not a good idea use studies of that kind as the cornerstone of an argument.  But the lack of current interest in the serial lesion effect has nothing to do with its falsification or being out of date.  Interest in the subject waned simply because researchers realized the effect was quite real; there is no pressing reason (or funding) for replicating an oft-replicated experimental effect.  Instead, the mechanisms underlying the functional sparing rightly came to dominate research.  The final paragraphs of Patrissi’s and Stein’s study, in fact, offer a brief discussion of the possible mechanisms of recovery for their frontal lesion rats.  So perhaps there is reason for wonder why cases like Patrissi’s and Stein’s have never made there way into the discussion on multiple realizability and identity theory, but none for caution about the datedness of the evidence they provide.
	Regardless of its lack of history in the literature, however, the serial lesion effect and the GRP more generally have a considerable impact on philosophical positions like the identity theory and multiple realizability.  These cases show that the type of counterfactual dependence of psychological kinds on neurological kinds is not what the identity theorist’s position requires.  An identity of the one kind with the other would presumably have consequences like, ‘if the neurological kind had been destroyed, the psychological kind would have been destroyed, too’.  The GRP, however, demonstrates that these types of counterfactuals are, strictly speaking, not true.  Rather, if the neurological kind had been destroyed in a sudden fashion, then the psychological kind would have been similarly destroyed.  On the other hand, if the neurological kind were destroyed in a piecemeal, gradual manner, then the psychological kind would have been spared.  Such a refinement of the counterfactuals is not merely pedantic.  A genuine identity of psychological kinds with neurological kinds implies the former, empirically denied counterfactual.  Thus the updated iteration of this counterfactual, which takes into account the slow-going or sudden nature of the damage, shows that psychological kinds are simply not identical with neurological kinds.  
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^1	  Notice also that these numbers are higher than both the 20-day and 30-day seriatim rats (which, of course, had neural tissue removed and not just a 2-stage sham surgery), further demonstrating the psychological similarity of the seriatim rats (who had sufficient time to recover) and the shams surgery rats.
^2	  Notice that the demand that the relevant sciences fix their own respective taxonomies implies that judgments of sameness and difference of kind are easy to make for the philosopher who takes those sciences as given.  The amygdala is different from the corpus callosum because neuroscientific taxonomy recognizes them as different kinds.  This point sets aside any worries, at least in the context of psychological kinds being multiply realized in neurological kinds, about how to determine whether two realizers are in fact distinct—a question raised by Shapiro (2000) and (2004).  One can read the samenesses and differences right off the neuroscientific classifications.
